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ABSTRACT 
By carefully considering the various command structural options available 
in expeditionary warfare personnel, platforms and capabilities, the U.S. military 
can leverage these options and other components into an interrelated and more 
powerful operations program.  Particular structural variations are more conducive 
for supporting and expanding operational maneuver options, including facilitating 
assured access and entry from the sea.  This thesis analyzes complex 
organizational structures in an effort to maximize the Sea Basing and the Global 
Fleet Station (GFS) strategies for the U.S. military.  Systems engineering 
analyses were conducted for the GFS and the Joint Sea Base (JSB) based on 
needs, stakeholders and functions.  Qualitative evaluations based on these 
inputs led to extensive descriptions of organizational characteristics, design 
parameters and contingency factors for the GFS/JSB. 
A GFS is a self-sustaining sea base conducting regional operations 
through tailored and adaptive packages, including launching engagements with 
partner nations within areas of interest.  Based on these analyses, GFS 
Commanders would perform primarily as crisis managers, overseeing the GFS 
organization through partisan mutual adjustments made in response to 
competing demands in the political environment.  Configured as a responsive 
professional bureaucracy, the GFS would be intended to incorporate the 
standardization of specialized skills it collects, maintains and manages, typically 
learned elsewhere, i.e., similar to hospitals and universities whose doctors and 
professors respectively comprise the operating cores. 
Sea Basing is the culmination of joint combat power from the sea, 
encompassing select expeditionary joint forces with minimal if any reliance on 
land bases within the Joint Operations Area.  Based on these analyses, 
uncertainty and unpredictability of circumstances abound in the JSB adaptive 
administrative adhocracy where power shifts as teams of experts mutually adjust 
to a complex and dynamic environment. 
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GLOSSARY 
Assembling: integrating scalable joint capabilities.1 
Closing: the rapid closure of joint force capability to an area of crisis.2 
Coordinating: integrating inter-agency, joint, allied and coalition forces 
through information sharing, battle-space awareness within a net-centric 
environment. 
Customer: one who buys something in return for goods and services from 
the system.  Representative of the users of the system. 
Global Fleet Station: a self-sustaining sea base from which to conduct 
regional Phase 0 operations, through tailored and adaptive packages, and to 
launch a variety of engagements with partner nations within a regional area of 
interest.3 
Internal Personnel: one who takes guidance within the system to produce 
the output of the system.  Equivalent to Mintzberg’s operating core. 
Impact: a combination of a stakeholder’s influence on the system and of the 
importance of his/her actions on the system. 
Importance: the significance a stakeholder's actions have on the system.  
Influence: the capacity a stakeholder has to cause an effect on the system. 
Investor: one who transfers resources to empower another to perform in 
exchange for an expectation of a return (usually financial) on one’s investment. 
Market Segment: a subgroup of people or organizations sharing one or more 
characteristics that cause them to have similar product needs. 
Need: the end goal or solution to fix a problem. 
Operator: one who acts as an agent or acts in a direct manner performs an 
action as part of, in place of, or in concert with the system’s actions.  Equivalent 
to Mintzberg’s strategic apex and middle line managers. 
                                            
1 Department of Defense, 10-12. 
2 Department of Defense, 10-12. 
3 Erin Mcavoy. 
 xvi
Participant: one who takes part in the system’s activities, but operates 
independently from the system’s internal hierarchy. 
Partner: equivalent and independent service provider who takes part in a 
mutual undertaking. 
Problem: an unwelcome or harmful matter or situation needing to be dealt or 
overcome.  What is at issue?  What needs to be fixed? 
Reconstituting: the rapidly recovering, reconstituting and redeploying joint 
combat capabilities within and around the maneuverable sea base for 
subsequent operations.4 
Relevancy: the mechanism by which a need is satisfied and a problem fixed. 
Sea basing: the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, 
reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while 
providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select 
expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint 
Operations Area (JOA).  These capabilities expand operational maneuver 
options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.5 
Stakeholder: any individual or group who has a stake in what the system or 
project is trying to accomplish 
Sustaining: the persistence of joint forces afloat and ashore, through 
transition to decisive combat operations ashore.  Includes protecting force 
operations, specifically utilizing sea based strike assets.6 
System: a set of elements (e.g., stakeholders) that are either dependent or 
independent, but interacting pair-wise - temporarily or physically - to achieve a 
common purpose. 
User: individual who uses or operates the system. 
                                            
4 Department of Defense, 10-12. 
5 Department of Defense, 7. 
6 Department of Defense, 10-12. 
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Sea basing is a critical future national military capability that can legitimize 
the Navy’s role in today’s violent era of asymmetric challenges.7  The Global 
Fleet Station (GFS) was developed from sea basing, a fundamental concept of 
Sea Power 21.  Current pilot programs are underway by Task Groups 40.9 and 
60.4 to develop the GFS into a reliable option for Combatant Commanders.  
However, the concepts of sea basing and of a GFS serve different purposes in 
different contexts.  The GFS focuses on maritime biased Phase 0 operations, 
while a Joint Sea Base (JSB) would focus on forcible entry campaigns. 
After the Cold War, international politics began encompassing broader 
interactions among multiple state actors.  One underlying component was an 
apparent United States (U.S.) operational expansion beyond Europe toward 
emerging conflict areas, e.g., the Balkans and the Middle East.  Some areas sat 
astride national and socio-economic fault lines where societies struggled over 
territory and resources and where there was competition for military, economic,  
political and religious power.8  These potential and active trouble zones included 
contested, unstable areas where conflicts were likely to erupt over access to or 
the possession of vital materials.  Some of the most promising sources of oil and 
natural gas lie in offshore areas where ownership can be a matter of fierce 
dispute, leading to other problems such as environmental degradation, economic 
disorder, population growth, and transnational crime, possibly leading to ethnic 
wars and political rivalries.9 
A growing challenge in the military dimension of U.S. power-projection 
continues to revolve around increasingly complex operations owing to political, 
                                            
7 Vern Clark, 1-2. 
8 Samuel Huntington, 361-5. 
9 Michael T. Klare, 53, 60-1. 
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geographic and resource constraints.10  The reduction of forward deployed bases 
in Europe and the Western Pacific coincides with the trend of U.S. defense 
forces engaging in different areas of the world, e.g., Central Asia, Africa and 
Latin America.  Based on Gulf War II experiences, some allies simply cannot be 
relied upon to provide base access when and where needed by U.S. forces.  
Increased access to satellite services unfortunately allows regional rogue states 
both to pre-target key fixed facilities and to monitor U.S. deployments into 
forward bases.  Inadequate basing facilities appears the likely overall outcome.11 
Recent terrorist attacks on American assets overseas highlight the 
vulnerability of a stationary land based target.  Examples include the 1996 bomb 
attack on the U.S. military’s Khobar Towers barracks, U.S. embassy attacks in 
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the 
Yemeni port of Aden.12  In addition to the political and financial costs, overseas 
land bases are vulnerable to attacks from local and third-party special forces, 
commandoes and terrorists.  As U.S. opponents obtain modern weaponry — 
such as stealth, cruise and ballistic missiles — the technological advancement of 
their armament will threaten to make fixed bases more vulnerable to attack. 
U.S. military forces may continue to encounter access problems in 
operations around the world.  Recent events in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq 
underline the uncertainty of available land bases due to geographical or political 
factors that delay, limit or prevent their use.  In the buildup for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, the Army's 4th Infantry Division was denied entry into Iraq through 
Turkey.  The Air Force had to relocate command operations to Qatar and other 
locations, after Saudi Arabia restricted the use of its airspace by U.S. 
warplanes.13  Presently, the bill through the House of Representatives declaring 
 
                                            
10 Andrew Krepinevich, et al., 1-2. 
11 Andrew Krepinevich, 2-3 
12 Michael Satchell. 
13 Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., 1-2. 
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the Armenian genocide by the Ottoman Empire jeopardizes the flow of air cargo 
into Iraq through the Turkish Incirlik air base and the use of Turkish air space and 
sea ports.14 
U.S. forces are predicted to encounter anti-access (A2) strategies and 
area-denial (AD) operations from adversaries.15  Part of the high-tech revolution 
in military capabilities is intended to facilitate U.S. power projection from the 
homeland rather than from platforms in Europe, Asia and the Middle East.  Joint 
operations must dominate future military campaigns by meeting the A2AD 
challenge as a more capable and focused military.  Until the U.S. military devises 
more plausible joint operational concepts, it is likely transformation will be 
retarded.16  The logic underlying this paper is that the more the military focuses 
on a joint path solution, the more it will be able to concentrate its resources into 
successfully executing the emerging war-fighting concept of sea basing.  
Coordinated forces, doctrines and operational concepts could encourage the 
military to better address issues of force planning without inter-service feuds over 
limited resources and personnel.17 
A. SEA BASING 
In October 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, 
projected a vision called “Sea Power 21” to align the Navy’s efforts with national 
defense, accelerate its progress and activate the potential of Naval personnel.  
Sea basing was a fundamental concept within Sea Power 21, lying at the heart of 
the Navy’s continued operational effectiveness.  Sea basing would enhance 
operational independence and would support joint forces, through networked, 
mobile, and secure sovereign platforms operating in the maritime domain.18  Sea 
                                            
14 "Unearthing the past, endangering the future." 
15 G. John Ikenberry, 27. 
16 Krepinevich, 6. 
17 Krepinevich, et al.,2-3. 
18 Vern Clark, 1-2. 
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basing envisions the oceans as the world’s greatest maneuvering space and its 
biggest parking lot.  The aim is to master afloat logistics in terms of having 
access to and providing direct resources to ashore forces.19 
There is a need for a maneuverable facility to serve as a base of 
operations, a command center, a logistics node and a transportation hub 
whereby a commander can choose to exploit enemy weaknesses, employ the 
element of surprise, and circumvent enemy defensive preparations.  It would 
minimize the need for host nation support by providing a sustainable, sovereign 
platform that is relatively free from diplomatic, regulatory, and political 
constraints, thus limiting the impact of A2AD challenges.  These forward 
operating sea based forces would possess inherent force protection while 
providing connectivity to leverage national assets through a reach-back 
capability.20  Within a joint warfare concept, sea basing would function in 
conjunction with land bases and global air strike and transport capabilities.  Sea 
basing is therefore a future expeditionary concept of a base at sea with the ability 
to enable and sustain operations up to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade or an 
equivalent sized Army unit up to 2,000 miles from shore. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a redefinition of the U.S. Navy is 
emerging, designed to better align naval forces with national security threats.  
Although the U.S. Navy is the preeminent oceanic force, the current war hinges 
primarily on successful ground forces.  Sea basing, the promising idea 
introduced by Sea Power 21,21 is intended to play a crucial role in that 
redefinition.  As a future national military capability and an evolving Joint 
Integrating Concept (JIC), sea basing is designed to fulfill the shift in U.S. global 
basing policy of placing more emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble 
spots across the globe and making U.S. forces more agile and expeditionary.22 
                                            
19 Geoffrey Till, 16. 
20 Vern Clark and Michael W. Hagee, 6. 
21 Stephen Saunders, 2. 
22 Donald H. Rumsfeld, quoted by Department of Defense, 6. 
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B. GLOBAL FLEET STATION 
The physical manifestation of the sea basing concept is the GFS, defined 
as a sustained sea base from which to conduct primarily regional operations 
through tailored and adaptive packages, and to launch a variety of engagements 
with partner nations within a regional area of interest.23  A GFS would incorporate 
the long term vision of a 1,000 ship Navy or the Global Maritime Partnership.24  
This future package shifts the sea basing concept in major ways. 
First, access by definition is a joint problem requiring joint participation.  
Jointness in sea basing terms means the ability of the system to serve as a Joint 
Task Force Commander's (CJTF) location, to serve as a dynamic base of 
operations, to handle logistics and to support and sustain operations from the 
sea for all four services plus special operations forces.25  The scenario of an 
increasing lack of access highlights a significant weakness of which sea basing 
was designed to address, i.e., substantial forces and services delivered directly 
from sea platforms, mitigating a lack of land bases.  Sea basing could become 
increasingly central to most joint military planning.  Independence to act, forward-
based mobility, and the added security of a moving platform are reasonable 
outcomes for the U.S. military, as operational reach and connectivity become 
more advanced and capable.26  Resolving or aligning these interacting 
components will require deep Army and Air Force participation. 
As defined by Admiral Mullen, a GFS would serve as a “hub where all 
manner of Joint, inter-agency, international organizations, navies, coast guards 
and non-governmental organizations could partner together as a force for good.”  
The GFS directly supports the growing international interest in global maritime 
partnerships, a foundation and enabler for the 1,000-ship Navy concept.  The 
                                            
23 Mcavoy. 
24 Geoff Fein. 
25 Defense Science Board Task Force, 9. 
26 Charles W. Moore and Edward Hanlon Jr. 
 6
1,000-ship Navy is to be a loose coalition of like-minded navies operating 
together for a common aim.27  A GFS providing primarily benign, regional 
presence would be intended to build regional support through inter-service 
training with local forces. 
During this spring and summer, the pilot GFS led by Task Group 40.9 on 
the Swift (HSV 2) attempted to validate the GFS concept by enhancing 
cooperative partnerships with regional maritime services.  The U.S. Navy and 
Coast Guard training teams and U.S. State Department representatives 
facilitated training sessions with their Central American counterparts.  Training 
covered techniques for assessing internal security, assessing vulnerabilities and 
how to put plans in place to mitigate them, navigation and small-boat handling 
and sharing ideas on effective leadership.  In addition, the Task Group hosted 
the U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, built a latrine for a local indigenous village, 
visited local schools, hosted several tours, participated in sporting events, hosted 
a barbeque and held a ground-breaking promotion ceremony. 
Continuing on the concept of a GFS as an enabler of the 1,000 Ship Navy, 
current maritime-oriented exercises are arguably shallow in the primary sea 
basing attribute of jointness.  Notably absent from Task Group 40.9 was any 
Army and Air Force involvement.  This is also the case with the upcoming Africa 
Partnership Station (APS) 28 conducted by Task Group 60.4 in Africa.  While 
inter-service rivalries make a JSB traditionally challenging, increasing joint 
capabilities should be paramount for implementing the sea basing concept as a 
critical future national military capability for the U.S.29  Progress towards a truly 
joint approach for sea basing construction and operation is impeded by a lack of 
a unified vision and sufficient coordination among the services.30 
                                            
27 Mike Mullen, Remarks at NWC Current Strategy Forum, 8. 
28 "Africa Partnership Station (APS)… Promoting Maritime Safety and Security." 
29 Defense Science Board Task Force, ix, xi. 
30 Till, 47. 
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Second, the GFS is intended to focus on delivering comprehensive and 
coordinated regional engagements and stability, specifically Phase 0 operations, 
i.e., joint and multinational operations and interagency activities performed to 
dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationship with 
friends and allies.31  Such activities involve traditional security operations, mobile 
training teams, construction assistance, medical outreach, humanitarian 
assistance mission, disaster relief, and information sharing.  Many of these are 
incorporated into the information exchanges and training exercises with 
partnership countries conducted by Task Group 40.9 in their pilot GFS and 
planned by Task Group 60.4 for their upcoming APS deployment. 
As pilot programs, it is understandable for Task Groups 40.9 and 60.4 to 
begin with low level, less confrontational exercises in relatively predictable 
environments.  Naval forces deployed in troublesome regions historically have 
had considerable value in shaping the strategic environment.  Called “gunboat 
diplomacy,” the mere presence of Naval forces could deter potential adversaries, 
creating an optimal political context, reducing or sometimes obviating the need 
for high-intensity combative operations.  A naval diplomatic campaign could win 
friends and influence people to collectively maintain order against threats to 
international sea-based trading systems ranging from crime to terrorism.32 
The GFS pilot programs emphasize shaping or preparatory actions, 
instead of more aggressive military operations which might face additional 
budgetary constraints.  The GFS is meant to enable Naval assets to operate 
where there is a requirement across the maritime security spectrum, without the 
high overheads of a steaming carrier battle-group.  Sea based stations would be 
designed to handle a range of responses at the more local level providing a less-
cost, high-yield sea based option for achieving national objectives.33 
                                            
31 “Joint Operations,” IV-27. 
32 Till, v, 3-5. 
33 Stephen Trimble, 3-4. 
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The GFS is a separate but complementary entity from a JSB.  The GFS is 
dependent upon global maritime partnerships to be an enabler of the 1,000 ship 
Navy.  Additionally, it must operate within the greater context of a joint campaign 
in conjunction with a JSB.  Each addresses different phases of the joint 
campaign with different purposes and goals.  GFS strategists deal with budgetary 
constraints attempting to jump-start the nascent development of a sea based 
force.  Concurrently, JSB strategists deal with the projection of U.S. policy rapidly 
and deeply inside continental confines.34   
C. PURPOSE 
This thesis qualitatively evaluates organizational models based on needs, 
stakeholders and functions with an eye towards relevant and applicable 
organizational structures.  The first concept is a maritime-oriented GFS model 
focused on Phase 0 and V operations.  The other is a JSB command capable of 
conducting and supporting a multi-phase military campaign.  These 
complimentary concepts would span the full range of sea basing requirements 
through the entire Joint campaign from start to finish and the start of the next 
cycle. 
Currently, the GFS pilot programs involve traditional military organizational 
structures centered on a primary vessel as a logistics, command and control 
center.35  Task Group 40.9 consists of a command element, the crew of HSV-2, 
the Swift, and training teams from the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and 
State Department.36  As the GFS concept matures, the coordination of joint U.S. 
and inter-operating allied forces may require a structure that better balances 
military requirements of command, control and authority with semi-autonomous 
teams, all processed through the lens of politically rational decision making.  GFS 
Commanders dealing with an array of expeditionary, cross-service and cross-
                                            
34 Defense Science Board Task Force, 12, 19. 
35 “White Paper on Global Fleet Station,” 2. 
36 Cynthia Clark. 
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cultural semi-autonomous teams with their requisite political and geographic 
concerns may need a more flexible and responsive structural capability.37 
Currently, the characteristics of a GFS and a JSB are being determined 
using a traditional top-down executive, management team.  According to the 
Defense Science Board, a Joint Sea Base Program Office is listed as the first of 
the “dirty dozen” issues the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to address for a 
future sea basing capability.  Managing a wide ranging, multi-service program will 
require a leadership structure and style that spans diverse disciplines and 
expertise.38  Earlier this year, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
determined that the DOD has not fully established a comprehensive 
management approach to effectively guide and assess joint sea basing and has 
not fully incorporated management practices, such as providing leadership, 
dedicating an implementation team, and establishing a communications 
strategy.39  The underlying assumption is that the structure and coordinating 
mechanisms for maintaining and executing these new GFS and JSB concepts 
will impact their effectiveness, including the management of politically sensitive 
strategies and operations, personnel, afloat and ashore logistics, and deployment 
and sustainment of semi-autonomous expert teams. 
This thesis proposes a potential structure of a GFS command organization 
suitable to the mandates, missions and interrelatedness issues, with particular 
focus on maritime oriented, Phase 0 and V operations.  A JSB organization 
supporting a prolonged and more intense inland campaign is used for 
comparison purposes.  The paper begins with a systems engineering analysis of 
relevant concepts.  Parameters describing needed characteristics will lead to the 
formulation of distinct organizational structures for each system.  This thesis then 
concludes with an extensive description of each structure within a practical, 
systematic and methodical framework. 
                                            
37 Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the Research, 311-3. 
38 Defense Science Board Task Force, 47. 
39 Government Accounting Office, 10. 
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Figure 1.   Pictorial Overview of Methodology 
 
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 
The terminology used in the subsequent analyses was based on the 
definitions listed in the glossary.  A needs analysis identified the relevancy for the 
GFS and JSB, which would in turn identify their functions in a functional analysis.  
A stakeholder analysis identified all first- and second-order stakeholders for 
each.  Functional architectures identified the functions unique and critical to the 
GFS and JSB. 
A needs analysis was performed and summarized the background section 
of this thesis.  Problems were defined in terms of what may be deficient 
concerning the current situation.  Needs were defined in terms of the end goals 
or solutions to mitigate or resolve the defined problems.  Relevancy was defined 
in terms of the potential mechanism to satisfy needs and address problems. 
A stakeholder analysis was performed to identify the greatest number of 
stakeholders for the system (i.e., the GFS or JSB).40  A stakeholder was defined 
as any individual or group who has a stake in what the GFS or JSB is trying to 
accomplish.  To limit the scope of the analysis, a threshold of relationships was 
                                            
40 Gary Langford, “Stakeholder Analysis,” 6-9. 
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arbitrarily established at the second order.  Stakeholders were identified through 
iterative steps that continually identified more and more relevant individuals.  
First, a preliminary list of first- and second-order stakeholders was established 
over the course of the GFS/JSB life cycles from conception to disposal.  Second, 
additional stakeholders were identified based on assumptions made and risks 
assumed by each stakeholder.  Third, stakeholders were identified based on (1) 
their relationship with the GFS/JSB domain (boundary, internal or external 
element), (2) GFS/JSB functions (as described below through functional 
decompositions), (3) missions and objectives (based on the needs analysis 
previously described), and (4) their interests at stake with the GFS/JSB.  Lastly, 
the resulting stakeholders were categorized into appropriately exclusive types in 
relation to the GFS/JSB.41 
Each type of stakeholder was then examined according to several factors 
used in diagnosing their potential effect on the GFS or JSB.  The potential impact 
of a stakeholder was determined through a combination of influence and the 
likelihood of each involved in an important interaction.  Resource control, power, 
action, and coalitions involvement were factors used in diagnosing threat and 
cooperation potential.  Based on the impact, threat and cooperation potential for 
each stakeholder type, general strategies for stakeholder management were 
predicted for both the GFS/JSB.42 
Concurrently, functional decompositions were constructed for a top-level 
description of a GFS and of sea basing based on written literature.43  Lines of 
operation were initially used as the critical functions of sea basing.44  Additional 
references45 were used to elaborate on each function and ensure various 
                                            
41 Jefferey Harrison and Caron J. St. John, 52-7, Langford, “Stakeholder Analysis,” 8-9 and 
Mark Maier and Eberhardt Rechtin, Chapter 5. 
42 Grant Savage, et al., 64-7. 
43 Benjamin Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrycky, 84-86. 
44 Department of Defense, 7. 
45 Vern Clark, 6, Defense Science Board Task Force, 11-42 and National Research Council, 
11-14. 
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interpretations of sea basing were taken into account.  The major functions were 
realigned and abstracted to fit key words used commonly in GFS articles46.  
Finally, the GFS/JSB concepts were combined with the Phases of Joint 
Operations47 to create an overall flowchart. 
B. QUALITATIVE EVALUATION 
Based on the relevancies, functions and stakeholders for the GFS/JSB 
from the previous systems engineering analysis, design parameters and 
contingency factors were examined.  Elements within each domain served as the 
basis for each organization.  These characteristics were then used to determine 
which of four organizational configurations and five structural configurations fit 
the descriptions of each.48  Lastly, the organizational designs were described in 
further detail through a structured, step-wise approach for analyzing the key 
variables of organizational success.  These nine tests49 integrated the findings 
from the previous analyses into comprehensive descriptions of the GFS and JSB, 
addressing all critical aspects of each organization.  The first four were fit tests 
providing an initial screen for design alternatives.  The next five were good 
design tests to refine the prospective designs by addressing potential problem 
areas. 
 
                                            
46 Mcavoy, “White Paper on Global Fleet Station.” 
47 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, IV-26-9. 
48 Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of Research, 65-298 and Nancy 
Roberts, 217-233. 
49 Michael Goold and Andrew Campbell, 117-8. 
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III. RESULTS 
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 
1. Needs Analysis 
Based on the background section, specifically concentrating on a historical 
reference50, problems, needs and relevancies are listed below. 
 
Figure 2.   Summary of Problems, Needs and Relevancy of GFS and JSB 
Leading to Systems’ Functional Decompositions. 
 
Past events lead to awareness of problems, which must be addressed.  
As operations become more concerned with building the peace in situations 
where societies are fractured and governments collapsed, expeditionary 
intervention operations may last longer than expected.  Unless the scale and 
challenge of such sustainment requirements are met, poor planning and 
                                            
50 Till. 
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insufficient time for preparations may result.  Public opinion’s limited tolerance for 
casualties may make early and possibly decisive use of lethal ground forces 
more difficult.51  Also, adversaries with long histories, local political connections 
and topological knowledge in remote regions have an information advantage 
over U.S. forces with limited initial intelligence.  The distributed nature of modern 
battlefields over land, sea and air across long distances can result in problematic 
lines of communication.  Land bases are more open to threats applicable to the 
task of moving and storing supplies. 
Such problems generate requirements, which must be met.  There is a 
need for an agile logistics campaign as invulnerable as possible in response to 
reconfiguring forces and adapting operational plans to new environments.  The 
fleet’s capacity to support operations ashore must meet the scale and challenges 
of any sustainment effort.  The force ashore and the supply system must cope 
with the basic unpredictability and the diplomatic complications of the situation 
confronting them.52 
Conflicts often unfold in a non-linear fashion generating a complex web of 
interrelated military and political dimensions.  The U.S. Navy intends to 
revolutionize and transform the operations of expeditionary forces by improving 
operational access, enhancing their capacity for both forward defense and 
effective response across a spectrum that starts with crisis management and 
ends with forcible entry.  Winning the peace and the war are closely intertwined.  
The GFS and the JSB together allow for the versatility to cope with the entire 
spectrum of non-war and war.53  GFS would aim to win the peace through crisis 
management, while the JSB would prosecute war through forcible entry 
operations.  The relevancy of the U.S. Navy may lay in fulfilling the needs and 
overcoming the problems stated above. 
                                            
51 Till, 22, 28-9, 34. 
52 Till, 21-2, 34. 
53 Till, 17, 31, 35. 
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2. Stakeholders Analysis 
Possible first- and second-order stakeholders were identified through 
iterative steps described in the methodology section. 
 
Figure 3.   Depiction of Stakeholder Types During the Operational and Support 
Phase of Life Cycle as Elements in Relation to the JSB and GFS Domain 
 
Internal elements are those individuals and entities within the domain of 
the system (i.e., those working in the GFS or JSB).  A system is a set of 
elements (e.g., stakeholders) that are either dependent or independent, but 
interacting pair-wise, temporarily or physically, to achieve a common purpose.  
The boundary of the system represents the permanent and episodic interactions 
between elements, domains and other systems.  The system boundary 
represents the lasting and occasional interactions and behaviors of a system or 
system of systems.54  First-order stakeholders include those in direct connection 
with the system, though not within the respective domain (i.e., those meeting with 
member of or interacting directly with the system).  Second order stakeholders 
include those with indirect connection to the GFS/JSB domain through direct 
contact with first-order elements. 
                                            
54 Langford, “Stakeholder Analysis," 3. 
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The primary stakeholders change as the project progresses through its life 
cycle.  The number of stakeholders gradually rises as the project comes into 
existence as an operational system.  The number reaches a maximum during the 




Figure 4.   Primary Stakeholder Types Listed over the Life Cycle Phases of the 
Project and Graphed According to Their Potential Effect on Project Over 
Time. 
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Subsequent analyses were only made for the operations and support 
phases of the system’s life cycle, the only time interval when the GFS/JSB would 
be functional.  While each type may consist of individual stakeholders with 
varying degrees of each factor, a representative was sought to get an overall 
view of each type. 
Table 1.   Stakeholders Listed According to Their Relationship Type to a GFS 
and a JSB.55 
STAKEHOLDER TYPE GLOBAL FLEET 
STATION 
JOINT SEA BASE 
Investor U.S., allied, friendly nations U.S., allied, coalition nations 
Users people in need, WMD 
survivors, IDP, local 
communities, underdeveloped 
maritime and security foreign 
forces: emergency care 
workers, host nation 
government representatives, 
law enforcers, clinics, 
hospitals, health care 
providers, fishermen, natural 
resource managers, teaching 
professionals, food distributors 




Conceptualizers NPS, ONR, CNO NPS, JCSC 
Designers NAVWARDEVCOM, JCIDS, NWDC, DECAS, GAO, General 
Services Administration, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense 
Acquisition Board, U.S. contracting office, program manager 
Builders commercial defense contractors, shipyards, naval bases 
Infrastructure Supporters U.S. and foreign airports, naval 
bases, commercial ports, 
maintenance crews, local 
construction crews, local 
financial and insurance 
companies 
U.S. and allied airports, naval 
bases, commercial ports, 
maintenance crews 
                                            
55 Harrison and St. John, 53, and Langford, “Stakeholder Analysis," 9-10. 
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STAKEHOLDER TYPE GLOBAL FLEET 
STATION 
JOINT SEA BASE 




providers, SPAWAR, Assigned 
Vessels, bus drivers, train 
operators, commercial pilots 
and crews 
commercial shipping, transport, 
cargo companies, 





expeditionary, functional teams subordinate commands 
Operators COCOMs, GFS crew JTF, JSB crew 
Customers SYSCOM, American Public, 
Congress, U.S. taxpayers, IRS 
SYSCOM 
Participants BUMED, NECC, FAO, DOS, 
ambassadors, DHS, Coast 
Guard, police, law enforcers, 
firefighters, allied and friendly 
operators, CIA, FBI, local 
knowledge providers, WMD 
inspectors, educators, trainers, 
oceanographers, 
meteorologists 
Joint Forces, local and internal 
knowledge providers (Intel, 
Oceanography, Crypto) 
Partners other GFSs, U.S. and Allied 
battle groups, Interpol, friendly 
maritime forces, lawyers, 
prosecutors, judges, public 
sanitation engineers, 
desalination plants, gas station 
attendants, utility companies, 
financial institutions, 
recreational and tourist 
companies, supermarkets, 
farmers, civil servants, port 
security 
allied, coalition forces, UN 
Suppliers commercial retailers, 
pharmaceutical industry, 
industrial manufacturers, 
hardware, software producers, 
parts suppliers, training 
facilities, academies, schools 
commercial retailers, industrial 
manufacturers, hardware, 
software producers, parts 
suppliers, training centers, 
academies, schools 
Competitors Army, Air Force, peer 
competitors (France, Russia, 
Iran, China...), Rebellious 
Factions, Insurgents 
nations impeding access, peer 
competitors, rebellious factions, 
insurgents, financial and 
military supporters of enemy 
regime 
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STAKEHOLDER TYPE GLOBAL FLEET 
STATION 
JOINT SEA BASE 
Adversaries enemy nations, non-state, unlawful or insurgent organizations 
U.S. Government Agencies DOS, embassies, diplomats, 
Treasury Dept, congressional 
oversight committees, GAO, 
military and civilian intelligence 
agencies 
DOS, Treasury, Justice Dept, 
GAO, congressional oversight 
committees, military 
intelligence agencies 
International Organizations UN, NATO, international treaty 
organizations, EU, 
multinational energy, mining, 
financial corporations, 
Merchant Marines 
UN, NATO, bilateral treaty 
recipients 




third party maritime and military 
forces, neutral states 
host nation, allied and coalition 




representatives, third party 
maritime and military forces, 
neutral states 
Activist Groups regional, humanitarian NGOs 
(USAID, Red Cross, 
environmental groups), media, 
Veterans Associations, web 
communities, lobbyists, 
regional factors, journalists, 
anyone with a camera, 
churches, mosques, temples, 
local religious, cultural, social 
institutions, associated family 
and significant others of 
operators and other internal 
personnel 
media, lobbyists, anyone with a 
camera, associated family and 
significant others of operators 




Figure 5.   JSB, GFS Domain Showing the Multiple Interactions Between 
Stakeholder Types. 
GFS and JSB Commanders must prioritize their efforts to meet the 
demands of stakeholders with the greatest impact to the system.  To determine 
appropriate responses to various stakeholders, the potential for impact to the 
system was determined from the degree of influence the stakeholder would have 
on the system and from the importance a stakeholder action might be.  Influence 
was based on the relationship of the stakeholder to the system domain.  An 
arbitrary scale of one to twelve was used.  Those internal to the domain had the 
greatest influence and therefore a twelve.  Those external had the least with a 
one.  Importance of stakeholder action was based on the number of interactions 
each stakeholder type had with all the other types.  The greater the number of 
direct interactions one type had with the other players in the system, the greater 
likelihood any action taken by that stakeholder would affect the system as a 
whole, rather than just an isolated part of the system.  The impact of a 
stakeholder is a combination of influence and importance of each stakeholder.  
To rank the stakeholders by their potential impact, the assigned influence and 
importance values were multiplied.  The stakeholders were then listed with those 
having the highest impact at the top of the following Table. 
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Operators 12 (Internal) 11 132 
Internal Personnel 12 11 132 
Users 6 (First Order) 10 60 
Adversaries 6 9 54 
Designers 9 (Boundary) 5 45 
Partners 9 5 45 
Participants 9 5 45 
Builders 9 5 45 
Infrastructure 
Supporters 
9 4 36 
Activist Groups 6 5 30 
Infrastructure 
Providers 
9 3 27 
Suppliers 9 3 27 
International 
Organizations 
3 (Second Order) 7 21 
U.S. Government 
Agencies 
3 7 21 
Foreign 
Governments 
3 7 21 
Competitors 3 4 12 
Customers 1 6 6 
Investor 1 6 6 
Conceptualizers 1 3 3 
 
While it would be expected that the operators and internal personnel 
central to the JSB/GFS system domain would have the greatest influence, 
importance and impact, the next two stakeholder types are noteworthy.  As seen 
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in the needs analysis section, the adversaries cause the problems, which the 
users have a need to resolve.  These two types define the relevancy of the 
system.  The system’s primary function is to eliminate the problems caused by 
the adversaries and provide solutions to the users. 
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Each type was described using four factors for threat or cooperation 
potential for the GFS. 
Table 3.   Stakeholder Type Described Using Four Factors for Threat or 





POWER ACTION COALITION 
Investor controls more supportive may find other 
alternatives 
Users does not control more supportive likely 
Conceptualizers does not control less supportive likely 
Designers controls more supportive likely 
Builders controls more supportive likely 
Infrastructure 
Supporters 
controls less supportive likely 
Infrastructure 
Providers 
controls more supportive likely 
Internal Personnel does not control less supportive likely 
Operators controls more supportive likely 
Customers controls more supportive likely 
Participants control more supportive likely 
Partners control more supportive may find other 
alternatives 
Suppliers controls less supportive likely 
Competitors does not control more non-supportive unlikely 
Adversaries does not control more non-supportive unlikely 
U.S. Government 
Agencies 




controls more scenario 
dependent 




controls more scenario 
dependent 
may find other 
alternatives 
Activist Groups controls more supportive likely 
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Table 4.   Stakeholder Type Described Using Four Factors for Threat or 





POWER ACTION COALITION 
Investor controls more supportive may find other 
alternatives 
Users controls more supportive likely 
Conceptualizers does not control less supportive likely 
Designers controls more supportive likely 
Builders controls more supportive likely 
Infrastructure 
Supporters 
controls less supportive likely 
Infrastructure 
Providers 
controls less supportive likely 
Internal Personnel does not control less supportive likely 
Operators controls more supportive likely 
Customers controls more supportive likely 
Participants does not control same supportive may find other 
alternatives 
Partners does not control same supportive may find other 
alternatives 
Suppliers controls less supportive likely 
Competitors does not control more non-supportive unlikely 





does not control less supportive likely 
International 
Organizations 





does not control less scenario 
dependent 
unlikely 
Activist Groups does not control less non-supportive unlikely 
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The stakeholder types were then categorized according to their potential 
for threat and cooperation. 
 
Figure 6.   Stakeholders Types with Respect to the Potential as a Threat or for 
Cooperation. 
 
Based on the stakeholder analysis, the majority of the GFS were mixed 
blessing stakeholders.  Mixed blessing stakeholders would have high potentials 
to threaten and to cooperate with the GFS.  Commanders in a GFS would 
concentrate a majority of their time balancing multiple collaboration strategies in 
stakeholder management.56  The impact of any one stakeholder type listed in the 
mixed blessing box is less than that of the users and adversaries.  However, due 
to the sheer number of mixed blessing stakeholders, GFS Commanders may find 
themselves dealing with these types more often than completing an assigned  
                                            
56 Savage, et al., 67. 
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mission, whether it be to the aid of a user or to eliminate an adversary.  The 
function of the GFS must therefore be more collaborative in nature rather than 
adversarial. 
Unlike the GFS, the JSB had a majority of supportive stakeholders.  
Supportive stakeholders are unlikely to serve as potential threats, but have high 
potentials for cooperation.  While JSB Commanders would need to involve its 
numerous supportive stakeholders to maximize their cooperative potential, JSB 
Commanders would focus a far greater portion of their time and effort towards 
the users and the adversaries previously shown to have the greatest impact on 
the JSB.  The JSB becomes the subordinate command to the user, whereas the 
users for a GFS are the people in need.  This shifts the user to become a mixed 
blessing stakeholder rather than a supportive one for the GFS.57  Due to the 
combative nature in a military setting, the JSB would achieve its mission by 
reducing, preferably eliminating, an adversary’s effect in an area, deter an 
adversary from action, seize the initiative or dominate the adversary.  These four 
interactions focused on its adversaries are elaborated in subsequent functional 
analyses. 
                                            
57 Savage, et al., 65-6. 
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3. Functional Architecture 
At the top of the functional flowchart is the ultimate aim of the U.S. Military, 
to defend our Nation against its enemies.58  To meet the need of protecting U.S. 
interests abroad, the U.S. Navy can choose to project a more cooperative image 
through partnerships and alliances and/or project direct and decisive power in a 
more forceful campaign.59  As stated in the needs analysis, there is a dichotomy 
of roles.  In one scenario, the U.S. would empower others to act in concert with 
its own forces.  In the other, the U.S. would play a dominate role.  Beneath these 
critical functions are the Phases 0-V in a Joint operations campaign, from 
shaping to enabling civilian authority.60  Additionally, there are transfer and 
support functions relevant to all Phases of a Joint campaign and to all methods of 
defending U.S. national interests. 
                                            
58 George W. Bush, 1. 
59 Vern Clark, 1. 
60 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, IV-26-9. 
 31
 
Figure 7.   Functional Decomposition of the U.S. Military Leading to the 




Figure 8.   Depiction of Joint Campaign Phases61 Juxtaposed Against the 
Roles of the GFS and JSB 
 
In scaling the level of combat intensity according to the Phases of a Joint 
campaign, Phases 0 (Shape) would start at a relatively low level of violence and 
instability.  As a campaign progresses to the next Phase, the level of violence 
and instability also increases to culminate in Phase III (Dominate).  Then, the 
level would decrease down to Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) before returning 
to Phase 0.  Reconstitution is considered a distinct and separate function 
applicable across the combat spectrum in this paper, since it involves activities 
separate from those enabling civil authority, though in Joint doctrine it is 
designated within Phase V operations.  The need to show a positive image 
decreases as the need for more forceful and uncompromising methods of 
resolution rises.  Matching these phases with the purposes of each, a GFS would 
                                            
61 Modified Diagram after Figure IV-6 in United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, 
IV-26. 
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operate at the low intensity scenario or Phases 0 and V while a JSB would 
operate in a high intensity scenario throughout the majority of a military 
campaign.  Fulfillment of the needs of these two war/non-war scenarios would 
match the characteristics of a JSB and a GFS respectively as stated in the needs 
and stakeholder analyses. 
Sustaining, assembling, coordinating, closing and reconstituting are 
relevant to both GFS and JSB and are named transfer functions in this context.  
As stated in the needs analysis, the basic requirements for both the GFS and the 
JSB are to project and sustain operations ashore and to overcome the 
unpredictability of a situation through mobility and knowledge flow.  These 
concepts match all but one of the five lines of operation,62 initially used as the 
primary functions of sea basing.  Coordinating replaces employing, since force 
employment is different for the GFS and JSB.  The lines of operations are the 
connections that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space 
in relation to the enemy.  They connect the force with its base of operations and 
its objectives.  They are defined in the Glossary section. 
 
                                            
62 Department of Defense, 10-12. 
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Figure 9.   Architecture of Transfer Functions.  Five Transfer Functions are 
Listed at the Bottom. 
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Showing a convincing positive image (e.g., as a benevolent regional 
influence) is one approach to protecting American interests abroad.  This more 
collaborative strategy matches the stakeholder analysis developed for the GFS.  
Although often termed “brand marketing” in the private sector, public or defense 
organizations can shape and influence an area of interest.  Shaping can involve 
controlling and preparing the maritime area of interest for U.S. involvement, 
providing flexible forces to fit the necessary needs of the area, and preventing 
potential adversaries from developing and strengthening opposing footholds.  
Portraying the U.S. in a benevolent image could revolve around the strategies of 
empowering and transferring responsibilities to local and civil authorities, while 
playing a relatively minor role in resolving disputes.  The purpose of the GFS 




Figure 10.   Elaboration of Global Fleet Station Functions, Based on the 
Primary Function of Showing an Image and the Secondary Function of 
Phases 0 and V of a Joint Campaign. 
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A more direct method of protecting American interests abroad is the 
application of military power projection.  Projecting power can revolve around the 
clear conveyance of an impression of strength or thrusting assets forward.  This 
focus on elimination of an adversary matches the stakeholder analysis for the 
JSB.  A projection of power involves stabilizing or securing an area or through 
deterrence or through seizing the initiative or dominating the scenario.  The 
purpose of a JSB would be to fulfill these overall functions from Phases I through 
IV of a Joint campaign. 
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Figure 11.   Elaboration of Joint Sea Basing Functions, Based on the Primary 
Function of Projecting Power and the Secondary Functions of Phases I to 
IV of a Joint Campaign. 
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B. QUALITATIVE EVALUATION 
Stakeholders within the GFS or JSB system domain, the internal and 
boundary elements from the previous stakeholder analysis, were matched 
according to the basic parts of an organization.63  The operators are the 
managers in the strategic apex and the middle line.  The internal personnel are 
the operating core.  The support staff consists of stakeholders providing and 
supporting the system while outside the system’s operating work flow.  The 
technostructure consists of agencies standardizing the process within the 
system. 
 
Figure 12.   Reclassification of Internal and Boundary Stakeholders according 
to Mintzberg’s Basic Parts of an Organization. 
 
Each part of the organization interacts with its own set of stakeholders.  
While the users for a GFS are the people in need with direct contact to the 
operating core, the users of a JSB are the superior officers presiding over the 
strategic apex.  Adversaries for both are dealt with by the operating core.  The 
support staff in turn have their own infrastructure supporters.  The 
technostructure has external elements which fund and direct their activities. 
                                            
63 Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of Research,18-34. 
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Using the basic system configuration, the GFS/JSB command structures 
were distinguished according to one of five possibilities.  Design parameters64 
were matched to the concepts of a GFS/JSB to choose one for each. 
Table 5.   Design Parameters for GFS and JSB. 
DESIGN PARAMETERS GLOBAL FLEET 
STATION 
JOINT SEA BASE 
Job Specialization Job Expansion: dealing with a 
variety of nations, 
organizations, and U.S. 
agencies 
High Horizontal, Low Vertical 
Job Specialization: 
professionals focused on 
mission success 
Behavior Formalization Formalized by job (Navy), by 
rules (Army Doctrine) 
Organic: prevent adversary 
from predicting and control 
situation 
Training and Indoctrination Training: professional 
development; internalized 
norms and standards 




Unit Grouping Social Interdependencies: 
grouping by client, what the 
situation needs to achieve 
social benefit 
Process Interdependencies: 
functional grouping by services 
and areas of responsibility 
Unit Size The greater the use of 
standardization for 
coordination, the larger the size 
of the work unit 
The greater the reliance on 
mutual adjustment, the smaller 
the size of the work unit; 
interdependencies among 
complex tasks; need for 
members to have frequent 
access to the manager for 
consultation or advice 
Planning and Control 
Systems 
Each unit has distinct outputs; 
regulated by performance 
controls 
Action Planning imposes 
specific decisions and actions 
to be carried out at specific 
points in time 
Liaison Devices Integrating manager to 
coordination through mutual 
adjustment by all parties; 
decision process cut across 
affected departments without 
formal authority over 
departmental personnel 
Task Force: committee formed 
to accomplish a particular task 
and then disband 
                                            
64 Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of Research, 65-214. 
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DESIGN PARAMETERS GLOBAL FLEET 
STATION 
JOINT SEA BASE 
Vertical Decentralization Parallel vertical 
decentralization: grant the 
power to function quasi-
autonomously, regulated 





work constellations grouped on 
a functional basis, coordinate 
its decision making largely by 
mutual adjustment 
Horizontal Decentralization Power to experts: Need for 
specialized knowledge with 
decisions highly technical; 
experts attain considerable 
informal power; the more 
professional, the more 
decentralized in both 
dimensions 
Power to experts: artificial 
distinction between line and 
staff, formal authority and 
expertise to advise 
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Contingency factors65 were matched to the concepts of a GFS and a JSB. 





JOINT SEA BASE 
Age New; but it must develop into a 
larger organization, more 
elaborate in structure, more 
specialized in tasks, more 
differentiated in units, more 
developed in administration. 
Established, formalized roles 
Size The larger the organization, 
the larger the size of its 
average unit 
Small group 
Technical System The more sophisticated the 
technical system, the more 
elaborate the administrative 
structure, the larger and more 
professional support staff, the 
greater the selective 
decentralization and the 
greater use of liaison devices 
Outputs are nonstandard, unit 
producers’ operating work not 
formalized, structure organic 
Environment Stable, complex, diverse, 
munificent: bureaucratic, 
decentralized, professional 
structure; predictable work - 
standardize; difficult to 
comprehend - decentralize 
Dynamic, complex, diverse, 
hostile: drive towards organic, 
decentralized structure 
Power Greater external control by 
media, politicians and military 
superiors, more standardized 
and formalized structure 
Centralized power 
 
Based on the dimensions of the five configurations,66 the GFS matched all 
but one of the design parameters and contingency factors for the professional 
bureaucracy.  Due to the GFS as a primarily military entity, a bureaucratic 
formalization of behavior was initially selected.  Most significantly, the GFS 
operates complex but stable Phase 0 and V operations with a wide range of 
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trained and indoctrinated specialists.  These factors eliminates the simple 
structure with too much control and responsibility on the chief executive.  Both 
the machine bureaucracy and the divisionalized form generate standardizations 
of work and output within a simple environment with few liaison devices and 
limited decentralization.  These traits do not fit with a GFS organization 
dependent on multi-agency and multi-national agents requiring coordination and 
mutual cooperation. 
Table 7.   GFS Associated Elements67 Highlighted Showing the Match to a 
Professional Bureaucracy. 
 
                                            
67 Modified after Exhibit III in Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?" 107. 
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The design parameters and contingency factors of the JSB matched all of 
those for the adhocracy.68  The JSB operates in a complex and dynamic 
environment requiring unpredictable solutions from an organic, highly trained 
command structure.  This dynamism prevents a JSB from successfully 
configured as a bureaucracy (e.g., machine, professional or divisionalized) 
whose standardizations would lead to results that any adversary could anticipate 
and exploit.  Also, due to the nature of a Joint organization trying to overcome the 
political and organizational divisions inherent within the present U.S. military 
bureaucracy, it would be self-defeating to have yet another bureaucracy as the 
solution.  While the unpredictability factor applies to the simple structure, a JSB 
must also have horizontal specialization to utilize the full range of possibilities all 
the services in the U.S. military can offer, requiring liaison devices and expertise 
beyond the capabilities of any one individual, even a chief executive. 
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Table 8.   JSB Associated Elements69 Highlighted Showing the Match to an 
Adhocracy. 
 
                                            
69 Modified after Exhibit III in Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?" 107. 
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Out of four organizational configurations, characteristics70 were matched 
to those of a GFS and a JSB to choose one for each. 
Table 9.   Organizational Characteristics for GFS and JSB. 
CHARACTERISTIC GLOBAL FLEET 
STATION 
JOINT SEA BASE 
Effectiveness Low High: optimize mission 
success. 
Efficiency Low Low 
Responsiveness High: ideal type in a political 
economy which requires 
organizations be accountable 
to the public by anticipating 
and responding to its 
concerns. 
Low: not generally, politically 
accountable. 





through interplay of politics and 
coalitions 
Implementation with lack of 
coherence among 
organizational parts 
Central Skills: manages crises; 
forms coalitions; bargains and 
negotiates 
Direction Setting and Planning: 
Vision and values drive from 
top 
Organizational coordination 
through task forces and 
coordinating committees 
Organizational norms: 
teamwork; creativity; flexibility 
Central Skills: inspires others 
to action; builds enthusiasm 
and commitment; articulates 
vision 
 
The characteristics of a GFS best matched those of a responsive 
organization.71  These characteristics do not match those of a directive 
organization since the GFS operates in an environment that is complex.  
Because every situation may be different, from disaster relief to training 
exercises to anti-piracy operations, there can be no top-down, directive hierarchy 
of goals or standard operating procedures existent within a GFS organization.  
Concurrently, its responsibilities as a primarily political entity prevents the GFS 
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from having the creativity and flexibility of an adaptive organization.  Lastly, 
without further development and a more established reputation, the GFS cannot 
reach the effectiveness and efficiency of a generative organization. 
The characteristics of a JSB best matched those of an adaptive 
organization.  With fewer mixed-blessing stakeholders than the GFS, the JSB 
does not need to deal with competing coalitions and stakeholder conflicts to the 
level a responsive organization does.  Being in a dynamic, hostile environment, a 
JSB cannot have the formalized routines of a directive organization based on 
standardized rules.  Since sea basing is a relatively new concept, Joint 
Commanders still lack the experience to form the JSB as a generative 
organization, empowering self-organizing teams and ventures to successfully 
align the strategic vision of joint sea basing with action planning to execute that 
vision onto the battlefield. 
 48
 
Figure 13.   GFS and JSB Efficiency and Effectiveness Dimensions72 
Highlighted Showing a Match for GFS with Responsive and JSB with 
Adaptive Configurations. 
Based on the design parameters, contingency factors73 and dimensions of 
efficiency and effectiveness, a GFS fits the description of a responsive, 
professional bureaucracy, whereas a JSB fits the description of an adaptive 
adhocracy. 
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C. ORGANIZATIONAL TEST 
To further examine the GFS and JSB organizations, a practical framework 
was used to guide the examination through the aspects of the each design.74 
Table 10.   Organizational Framework for GFS and JSB. 
TEST GLOBAL FLEET 
STATION 
JOINT SEA BASE 
Market Advantage Test 
matching overall function from functional architecture to the 
users in the stakeholder analysis 
define target market segment 
developing countries with 
people in need 
commanders with need for 
power projection from afloat to 
ashore 
matching Mintzberg organization with target market segment single unit dedicated to a single 
segment 
operating core consists of 
mobile, expeditionary teams 
tailored to each market 
segment for scenario based 
humanitarian and/or security 
missions 
operating core truncated to 
focus administrative adhocracy 
on directing the mechanisms 
and creating solutions for 
projecting power ashore 
matching organizational configuration with target market 
segment 
support key sources of 
advantage and related 
operating initiatives 
responsiveness to difficult and 
dangerous scenarios 
efficiency for mission success 
Parenting Advantage Test 
from functional architecture higher-level activities that 
provide real value to the overall 
company shaping, enabling civil 
governments 
stabilization, deterrence, 
seizing the initiative, 
dominance 
give sufficient attention to 
value-adding tasks and 
initiatives 




responsibilities and reporting 
relationships and wins their 
match the attributes of personnel in the strategic apex to 
demands based on stakeholder analysis and organization 
configuration and structure 
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TEST GLOBAL FLEET 
STATION 
JOINT SEA BASE 
commitment responsive, collaborative 
administrators able to balance 
the demands of the 
professional experts in the 
operating core 
experienced in driving 
efficiency within fluid structure 
of adhocracy while serving as 
liaison to primary stakeholder: 
COCOM. 
highly talented people staffing 
pivotal jobs 
ensure technostructure properly staff the strategic apex, middle 
line and operating core 
decreased role of Navy and realignment of power structure 
away from traditional military chain of command 
identify and deal with losers in 
reorganization 
personnel anxious to 
micromanage partners and 
participants in operating core 
personnel unable to yield 
authority within organic, 
unorthodox culture 
Feasibility Test 
government regulations must be particularly sensitive to 
respecting host nation cultural, 
social and political constraints 
follow guidance from JTF 
stakeholders see results from stakeholder analysis 
information system ensure coordination functions are in sync with the changing 
realignment.  based on contingency factor, technological 
systems. 
see identifying losers in people test corporate culture 
since other government 
agencies already employ the 
professional bureaucracy 
model, such a transition should 
not be too disruptive. 
truncating operating core from 
JSB adhocracy to isolate it 
from rest of Joint chain of 
command 
Specialist Cultures Test 
specialist cultures insulated 
from the rest of organization 
professional experts with 
extensive autonomy 
truncate operating core from 
JSB adhocracy 
based on contingency factor, power. any in danger of being 
dominated 
power flows from the 
professional experts up to the 
GFS Commanders, who are 
focused on managing the 
support staff and resisting 
interference from military 
superiors 
JSB Commander must protect 
the adhocracy from external 
interference 
Difficult Links Test 
links are self-managed 
networking among units 
based on design parameters, unit grouping, liaison devices, and 
decentralization 
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TEST GLOBAL FLEET 
STATION 
JOINT SEA BASE 
support staff enable links 
between teams in operating 
core, liaison devices ensure 
mutual adjustment for 
coordination 
entire structure based on fluid 
interdependent relationships 
between strategic apex, 
technostructure, support staff 
and middle line 
Redundant Hierarchy Test 
based on design parameter, decentralization. each level improve 
performance of units 
underneath three levels: GFS 
Commanders in strategic apex, 
liaison devices constitute 
middle line, GFS teams in 
operating core 
critical structure level between 
JTF and subordinate 
commands for maximum 
innovation 
every level has access to skills 
and resources it needs 
ensure support staff and technostructure adequately perform 
transfer functions from functional architecture 
Accountability Test 
any units with shared 
responsibilities 
middle line managers serve as 
liaison devices must clarify 
overlapping responsibilities 
dedicated working group solely 
devoted to finding sea basing 
solutions 
any units with performances 
difficult to measure 
performance measurements 
based on execution of 
expertise skill set, overseen by 
technostructure 
measurements based on 
successful execution of transfer 
functions within JTF mission 
Flexibility Test 
support the pursuit of future 
opportunities 
changes in operating core 
performance delegated to 
technostructure  
adhocracy chosen for maximal 
innovation through liberal 
distribution of power among all 
involved 
identify pockets of resistance see identifying losers in people test 
 
Along with brand marketing of a positive U.S. image and influence abroad 
(as noted in the GFS functional architecture), the GFS would need to be 
accountable to the American public and the international community by 
anticipating and responding to their concerns.75  Within such a political 
environment, a GFS appears most appropriate in a responsive professional 
bureaucratic configuration.  As a responsive organization, the GFS must be 
                                            
75 Roberts, 232. 
 52
accountable to a great number of stakeholders, responding to their concerns 
while managing their conflicts of interests.  A GFS configured as a professional 
bureaucracy would be intended to incorporate the standardization of specialized 
skills, typically learned elsewhere, i.e., similar to hospitals and universities whose 
doctors and professors comprise the “professional” cores respectively, both 
groups composed of somewhat interchangeable experts.  What would exemplify 
the GFS would be the expertise it collects, maintains and manages.  A GFS 
would tend to operate in relatively stable environments based on Phases 0 and V 
of a Joint campaign.  While the scenario is devoid of the intense violence 
occurring in more advanced stages of a Joint campaign, a GFS would still need 
to meet a complex set of expectations as designated in its functional 
architecture.76 
For a JSB, the environment is the chaos and complexity of war, i.e.,, the 
purpose being to project American power sufficient to return the situation back to 
one more suitable for a GFS.  As a Joint campaign advances beyond Phase 0, 
the JSB may encounter increasingly new and relatively unprecedented 
scenarios.  One view is that to succeed in these chaotic domains, JSB and JTF 
solutions would also encompass systematic and atypical actions.  While a JSB 
could be incorporated within a Joint Task Force (JTF) structure, an adhocracy 
structure might provide the flexibility and dynamism needed for interchangeable 
experts to quickly respond to the array of challenges in an A2AD scenario.77  The 
jointness of a JSB also necessitates liaison devices involving personnel in 
overlapping responsibilities and chains of command.  Flexibility, creativity, 
exploration and experimentation would be crucial components of an adaptively 
configured JSB, i.e., an adaptive focus, even at the expense of efficiency 
losses.78 
 
                                            
76 Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of Research, 366-71. 
77 Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of Research, 449-60. 
78 Roberts, 226. 
 53
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. THE GLOBAL FLEET STATION 
Based on the analysis of parameters in the results section, the Global 
Fleet Station may perform best as a responsive professional bureaucracy, i.e., a 
decentralized bureaucracy in a stable operating work environment leading to 
predetermined, predictable or standardized behavior.79  Duly trained and 
interchangeable specialists operating in flexible, expeditionary force teams would 
describe this type of GFS.  Specialist teams comprising the operating core 
require considerable local control in their respective domains, meeting the needs 
of target market segments within a humanitarian or security crisis scenario.80 
 
Figure 14.   Depiction of GFS Command Structure as a Professional 
Bureaucracy. 81 
 
                                            
79 Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?" 348. 
80 Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of Research, 349. 
81 Modified diagram after Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of 
Research, 355. 
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The GFS as a professional bureaucracy would consist of a Task Group 
assigned by the Component Commander (COCOM) as a GFS Command 
Element.  The decision making process would begin collectively from the 
specialist teams in the operating core, rise up to the GFS Task Group 
Commander, drawing on support staff where needed.  The DoD, the Department 
of State (DOS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are part of the 
technostructure providing high-level training and overseeing their respective core 
teams. 
In Phases 0 and V of a Joint campaign, restraint in military operations 
would be applied to gain the support of the local population.  Actions resulting in 
adverse political consequences would be avoided to project a positive image of 
U.S. involvement in the host nation.82  Under these conditions, a predetermined 
set of responses to heighten trust could be systematically prepared and 
practiced.  Through success and satisfaction with knowledge, truth, belief and 
retribution, foreign countries would expect and ultimately rely on a certain level of 
service (even perhaps a response at a certain level of violence) from the 
appropriate GFS team.  Each team within the operating core would exercise 
professional autonomy in developing appropriate relationships with host nation 
clients, i.e., decentralization would purposefully shift considerable decision 
making down to the operating team level.  The users and market segments 
serviced would be involved in determining the composition and functions of each 
GFS team.83 
Based on the functional architecture of a GFS, its primary purpose would 
be to portray a positive image of the U.S.  Its form true to its purpose, the 
professional bureaucratic GFS organization would disseminate operational 
execution power directly to its professional experts, providing GFS teams with 
the requisite autonomy.  Empowering the experts at its operating core reflects the 
importance of decision making occurring closest to the repertoire of services 
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needed.  The GFS’s strategic initiatives would therefore include team input from 
the ground up.  The GFS therefore serves its political and legal superiors while 
simultaneously serving the professionals in its operating core.84 
Based on stakeholder analysis, the GFS would devote time and energy 
collaborating primarily with its mixed blessing stakeholders, i.e., these can be 
swayed to support or can become non-supportive based on interactions.  GFS 
senior executives would perform the crucial boundary spanning roles between 
the GFS organization and relevant outside parties and governments.  As a 
professional bureaucracy, a GFS would accomplish this through the power of 
expertise.  Strategic coordination of a GFS would rely on individuals and groups 
located in the technostructure consisting of State, Defense and Homeland 
Security Department agencies.  Within a multinational, multi-agency campaign, 
GFS teams would want to be represented in administrative decisions affecting 
them.  As a result, the GFS Commander, professional administrator would need 
to incorporate team representatives into the GFS planning staff.  Liaison devices, 
task forces and standing committees would ensure mutual adjustment and 
coordination.85 
The GFS organization as a professional bureaucracy would result in 
parallel administrative hierarchies, one democratic and bottom up for the 
professional GFS teams and a second military bureaucracy, top down for the 
support staff.  With the operating core or the GFS teams as the key part of the 
professional bureaucracy, the support staff becomes the second most elaborate 
part of a GFS.  The support staff would consist of those involved in the transfer 
functions of a GFS: logistics, communications, human resources, legal, 
transportation, and maintenance.  It is here that the Navy will play the crucial role 
within a GFS, ensuring the needs of the operating core are adequately met for 
each team to fulfill its mission.86 
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There are foreseeable difficulties with a GFS organization as a 
professional bureaucracy.  As a professional bureaucracy, a GFS will spend very 
little time adapting itself to new circumstances outside the capabilities and 
experiences of its operating core.  Without proper oversight, there is no way to 
correct deficiencies that the GFS teams choose to overlook.  Without duly 
trained, ethical operators, the GFS Command may find difficulty in dealing with 
participants who are either incompetent or unconscientious.  The Command 
structure must step in should its operating core fail to support the purpose of the 
GFS: to promote a positive image of the U.S. 
Change, however, should not come from above the strategic apex; 
superior officers should refrain from announcing reforms to control the work of 
the GFS teams, resulting in direct supervision and standardization of work 
processes or outputs.  Naval GFS Commanders should not be expected to 
directly supervise the activities of GFS teams.  Hospital administrators do not 
supervise operations in a surgical ward; university deans do not supervise how 
their professors teach classes and conduct research.  As a realistic example, 
during the four month tour of the Navy hospital ship Comfort, doctors expressed 
frustration and public health experts expressed disappointment in the unfulfilled 
potential of the medical diplomacy initiative.  While the mission succeeded as a 
public relations tool, it did not tailor services to the needs of each country and 
failed to maximize the ship's facilities rarely using sophisticated, but available 
medical equipment.87 
Rather, GFS teams (like surgical teams and professors) have the skills to 
perform; primarily needing executive oversight and considerable support.  
Innovations would require change from the technostructure, being selective with 
incoming experts joining the operating core, advancing ideals and knowledge 
during training and indoctrination, and encouraging and rewarding the GFS  
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teams to upgrade their skill sets themselves.  This decentralized form is meant to 
facilitate better interactions between host nations and GFS professionals laying 
the groundwork for mutual trust.88 
A GFS responsive to contentious stakeholders could result in minimal 
efficiency and effectiveness.  Governance by conflicting interests (e.g., civilian 
versus military) may impede continuity of mission and policy enactment.  A GFS 
producing inconsistent, disjointed patterns of activity in response to competing 
demands in its political environment would result in the GFS Commander playing 
the role of crisis manager.  With a typical two to three year military billet rotation, 
GFS Commanders would unlikely develop the experience and establish the 
reputation to become a power broker necessary to consolidate interests within 
the GFS and provide coherent, integrated policies to guide the GFS as a whole.  
The solution is again not rooted in the GFS Commander, but rather in the 
willingness for external stakeholders to impact the operating core or the 
technostructure to work together in pursuit of common means and common 
ends.89 
B. THE JOINT SEA BASE 
Based on the results section, the Joint Sea Base parameters indicated an 
adaptive adhocracy summarized as interacting project teams: wide horizontal job 
specialization based on formal training; an inherent division along service lines 
while deploying constituents in a joint framework; a reliance on liaison devices 
facilitating mutual adjustment within and between task groups; and selective 
decentralization in various places within the organization and involving various 
mixtures of managers, staff and operating experts.  Overcoming a military 
adversary in a chaotic, violent environment may require the speed, innovation 
and flexibility only found in a more fluid (vice standardized) structure where 
power, coordination and control are by mutual adjustment of competent experts.  
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This depiction of a future, truly joint sea base transcends the traditional defense 
machine bureaucracy lionized with sharp divisions of labor, extensive unit 
differentiation, highly formalized, standardized behaviors and emphasis on 
planning and control systems.90 
 
Figure 15.   Depiction of a JSB Command Structure as an Adhocracy. 91 
A JSB as an adhocracy would consist of varying clusters of operational 
commanders and support staff.  The participants within a Joint Warfare 
Command would be the preliminary building blocks for a JSB.92  A JSB may be 
within a JTF established along a functional basis with the specific objective of 
sea basing with directive authority for common support capabilities over specific 
logistic forces, facilities and supplies.  Based on the mission, operational 
environment, and available capabilities and support, the JSB would initially be 
the JTF headquarters (HQ).  As a preponderance of Army and Air Force units 
develops in the joint operations areas (JOAs) and the Joint Forces Commander 
(JFC) or CJTF shifts to the CINC, the JTF HQ may shift ashore but continue to 
rely on the JSB for its support.  The JSB Commander (CJSB) may play the role 
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of the JFC or the JFMCC (Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander).  Or, 
the CJSB would receive orders from the JFC and work with the JFMCC within a 
joint force structure.93 
The JSB command would consist of military experts trained specifically for 
the sea basing scenario.  Specialists from all the services would tailor any 
responses through mutual adjustment within and between multidisciplinary teams 
or tasks forces around a specific campaign.  Those traditionally relegated to the 
support staff, responsible for transfer functions as stated before, would play key 
roles in interdependent relationships.  Larger, more integrated projects and a 
more focused sphere of operations mean the efforts of various specialists would 
often be interdependent.  The JSB command would be a system of work 
constellations, each located at the level of the hierarchy commensurate with the 
level of functional decision-making needed.94 
Decision making would flow to anyone in the organization based more on 
their formal skills and situational expertise rather than rank alone.  Each JSB 
would draw on line managers and staff specialists as necessary, distributing 
power to them and causing them to work together as experts.  Commanders 
within a JSB would become functioning members of the project teams, with 
special responsibility to effect coordination between them.  Strategy formulation 
in the JSB would not be clearly placed, but formed implicitly by joint 
experimentation and a spiral development process.95  Since the JSB adhocracy’s 
main purpose is to innovate, the results of its efforts would not be readily 
predetermined nor its strategy specified in advance.96 
The danger of an adhocracy within a military organization is a lack of unity 
of command.  With the power diffused throughout the organization, a JSB runs 
the risk of too little formalization of behavior.  To resolve this issue, JSB would 
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become an administrative adhocracy with a sharp distinction apart from its 
operating core, the subordinate task groups performing CJSB.  This truncation 
would allow the existing chains of commands to continue above and below the 
JSB while allowing the JSB to concentrate on overcoming the boundaries of the 
military bureaucracy.97  Orders would be received from the CJTF above.  The 
JSB command would manage the subordinate commands in the prepositioning 
forces for interoperability, complementary capabilities and maximum overall 
efficiency, affordability, and warfighting synergy.98 
The JSB Commander would mostly be occupied with internal battles over 
strategic choices, budgets and handling the disturbances that arise due to the 
fluid nature of the command structure.  They would devote considerable time 
personally monitoring projects, ensuring completion according to schedule, and 
within projected budget estimates.  More importantly, the JSB Commander would 
serve as the liaison or negotiator with external stakeholders, specifically JSB’s 
principal user stakeholder, COCOM.99 
The greatest danger of a JSB adhocracy comes from the military orthodox 
culture.  As noted in the people, feasibility and flexibility test, the lowers would be 
those who cannot accept such an unorthodox, organic structure embedding itself 
within the military.  JSB command personnel would need a high tolerance for 
ambiguity and a low tolerance for obscure authority relationships.  Coupled with 
the competitiveness and the politicization inherent in an adhocracy, conflicts 
would inevitably occur.  A skillful JSB Commander would do what commanders 
have always done - channel the participants’ aggressiveness towards productive 
ends beneficial to the JSB rather than individual goals.100 
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By focusing on effectiveness, the adaptive JSB would sacrifice efficiency 
and responsiveness, discarding rigid adherence to internal order and control.101  
The root of its inefficiency would be the high cost of coordination.  Time would be 
required so that dispersed experts would participate in decision making.  
Inefficiency may also result from unbalanced workload.  Due to the 
unpredictability of each scenario, some players may not be involved while others 
are overwhelmed with excess responsibilities.102  Alternatively, a future Sea 
Basing Planning Office may decide to bureaucratize the JSB.  Sea basing may 
cause a transformation of DoD force structure, logistics, training and supporting 
infrastructure as the ideas the adhocracy generates becomes more tested and 
validated.  However, efforts to standardize the organizational structure and to 
maximize overall efficiency should be delegated to the truncated operating core 
and not extend into the JSB.103  Perhaps in the future, after many trials and 
tribulations, JSB Commanders would have the experience to establish doctrine 
and standards essential for balancing the efficiency and effectiveness of sea 
basing.  So long as there is a need for effective, adaptive and innovative 
solutions to overcome obstacles within the military bureaucracy and against 
unprecedented adversaries in unpredictable scenarios, the JSB would do well to 
consider the adhocracy configuration. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS  
Table 11.   A Summary of the Results. 
 GLOBAL FLEET 
STATION 
JOINT SEA BASE 
Greatest Impact: Users and Adversaries Stakeholder Analysis 
Primary Type: Mixed Blessing 
Collaborative Strategy 
Primary Type: Non-supportive 
Reduce Strategy 
Show a Positive Image of the 
U.S. 
Project U.S. Power Functional Analysis 
Transfer Functions: Coordinate, Assembly, Close, Sustain, 
Reconstitute 
Structural Configuration Professional Bureaucracy Administrative Adhocracy 
Organizational Configuration Responsive Adaptive 
 
This thesis concludes that the GFS may be optimally served if structured 
more as a responsive professional bureaucracy, and the JSB as an adaptive, 
administrative adhocracy.  Relative fit with these configurations was established 
starting with a comprehensive systems engineering analysis.  The needs 
analysis defined the problems, needs and relevancies of a system consisting of a 
GFS and JSB.  The stakeholder analyses described over 100 stakeholders in 
terms of their potential impact during the operational and support phase of the 
GFS/JSB life cycle.  GFS and JSB Commanders would be formulating and 
implementing collaborative strategies with various mixed blessing stakeholders 
and defensive strategies against adversarial stakeholders.  The functional 
architecture showed the primary function of the GFS to be marketing a positive 
U.S. image, while that of the JSB to be projecting U.S. power.  Both entities 
would need to perform transfer functions, such as coordinating, assembling, 
closing, sustaining and reconstituting.  The proposed organizational structures 
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were further evaluated through design parameters, contingency factors, and 
organizational characteristics.  The proposed structural configurations were 
further elaborated through fit and design tests within an practical, step-wise 
organizational framework.  The organizational framework pulled in various parts 
of the systems engineering analysis and the qualitative evaluations to more fully 
describe the market advantage, parenting advantage, people, feasibility, 
specialist culture, difficult links, redundant hierarchy, accountability and flexibility 
of the GFS/JSB.  These tests ensured that this thesis addressed the critical 
aspects of the proposed GFS/JSB structures for a well-designed fit. 
The characteristics of a GFS best fit those of a responsive104 professional 
bureaucracy.  Since its primary purpose is to show a positive image, the GFS 
would be in essence a marketing entity with competing coalitions and 
stakeholder conflicts.  Its organizational coordination would only be successful 
through the interplay of politics and coalitions addressing the lack of coherence 
among its parts.  The central skills of its commanders would be to manage crises 
and form partnerships. 
The characteristics of a JSB best fit those of an adaptive105 administrative 
adhocracy.  The JSB would innovate within its complex environment.  Through 
task forces and mutual adjustments, the JSB would find new opportunities to 
forward the joint sea basing strategic vision.  This requires teamwork, creativity 
and flexibility.  The CJSB would inspire his subordinates to action and build 
enthusiasm and commitment to overcome inherent conflicts both internal and 
external to the U.S. military. 
A previous study106 proposed how a Navy-Marine Task Force operating in 
a littoral region would transition to a JTF.  As stated in the background section, a 
GFS lacks jointness and currently has a purely maritime focus.  With the proper 
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motivation, it is possible to incorporate the Army and Air Force into littoral Phase 
0 and V operations amongst the myriad of professional operators within a GFS.  
However, this thesis posits that such a transition does not apply due to the 
considerable differences between the GFS and JSB command structures.  The 
Army and Air Force were listed in the stakeholder analysis as non-supportive 
stakeholders with reduced impact since they have their own solutions (i.e., the 
Global Strike Task Force107) to the A2AD problem.  A GFS Commander would 
only be at the Task Group level, while a CJSB is proposed to be one level below 
the CJTF, if not the CJTF itself.  Incorporating non-supportive stakeholders within 
the operating core would significantly increase their impact on the GFS domain 
creating a more complex and difficult political balancing act for lower ranking 
Commanders.  In addition, the decision making process within a GFS begins with 
the specialist teams in the operating core.  In a JSB, the operating core is 
truncated and outsourced to subordinate commands. 
As stated in the background section, the U.S. military could devise 
consistent solutions for all the services to perform the same transfer functions for 
both Naval and Joint systems.  However, it remains to be seen whether the same 
assets used in a GFS could also be used in a JSB, since a GFS is primarily a 
Naval system while a JSB is a Joint system.  Far more likely would be a case 
where a GFS is incorporated underneath a JSB.  With a GFS as a JSB 
subordinate command, a JSB would ideally have interchangeable assets at its 
disposal.  A higher ranking CJSB could then transcend the self-interest within 
each of the services to utilize GFS assets within a wider Joint theater, political 
obstacles a lower ranking GFS Commander may be unable to overcome. 
B. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study used the following methodology.  The results of a needs 
analysis, stakeholder analysis and functional analysis were compared with the 
design parameters and contingency factors of five different structural 
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configurations and the organizational characteristics of four different 
organizational characteristics.  The comparison process selected specific 
structures for the GFS and the JSB.  Each organization was further evaluated 
through fit and design tests within a practical, step-wise framework.108 
Proposing defense entities in terms of various organizational structures 
was done to assist military leaders trying to adapt and transform their traditional 
structures into more innovative ones.  Matching an array of organizational 
configuration variables to emerging GFS and JSB designs was done to 
encourage creative thinking around possible structural changes to fit emerging 
sea basing requirements.  Managers and practitioners may benefit in terms of 
greater understanding of the following:  1) the interrelationship between 
organizational strategy and structure; 2) the complexity surrounding adapting 
traditional machine bureaucracy structures into more responsive, adaptive and 
interdependent project teams; and 3) the importance of describing and prioritizing 
stakeholders, including formulating and implementing stakeholder strategies. 
This thesis described different types of organizational command and 
operating structures designed to optimize potential performance of GFS and JSB 
strategies.  The premise is that alternative organizational structures may better fit 
the overall situational and contextual factors encountered in emerging GFS or 
JSB scenarios.  Using adhocractic structures known for generating innovation 
among interacting project teams can serve as a basis for force planning and 
doctrine formulation. 
Ship design could accommodate the structural configurations of each 
organization similar to how civilian technology companies continue to experiment 
with workplace design to promote flexible work styles.109  Common work 
environments and drop-in spaces accommodating mobile operators and 
facilitating contact and collaboration could boost productivity for both civilian and 
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military workers.  Privacy areas and quiet zones would allow for concentration 
and confidentiality.  A GFS would require a large, modular facility or a group of 
facilities to house the various and changing expeditionary teams in the operating 
core.  Some, such as Foreign Affairs Officers (FAO) and diplomats would require 
personnel accommodations tailored to respect and facilitate political, social and 
religious differences.  Others – Navy SEALs and the Coast Guard – would likely 
require their own transport vessels.  Coordination efforts materializing in 
communication networks with varying levels of security protocols and access 
would be necessary throughout the GFS.  Spaces would be designed as 
specifically conducive for liaison activities.  Meanwhile, a JSB could be situated 
on a single command ship dedicated for joint coordination.  Ship design for the 
JSB would emphasize a single command ship, preferably dedicated for joint 
coordination, given the size of the command and the outsourcing of its 
operations.  The fluidity of the JSB adhocracy would need to be taken into 
account when designing the command center to allow all dispersed experts to 
participate in the decision making process without compromising on efficiency.  
Designers of the JSB command center would need to allow maximum command 
and control with its subordinate units, most likely not represented on the JSB 
command ship due to the service oriented structure of the current military. 
Alternative organizational structures still require human resource 
managers to match appropriate personnel with like billets.  Other professional 
bureaucracies – hospitals and universities – have demonstrated the utility and 
clarity of highly skilled professionals making situational requirement decisions, 
similar to GFS responsive requirements.  GFS Commanders can replicate the 
private practice of brand marketing combined with naval diplomacy to fulfill the 
primary GFS function of portraying a positive and strong U.S. image  They would 
speak in terms of collaborative and defensive strategies around important 
stakeholders, while JSB Commanders would seek to project power and 
maximizing effectiveness possibly at the expense of favorable images. 
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis used a synthesis of established academic and practical 
techniques, which future researchers and business executives could use for 
determining organizational configurations designed to fit varying environmental 
contexts.  Project managers could use the system engineering analyses to gain 
insight across project life cycles.  While the methodology focused primarily on 
operations and support aspects, project managers may benefit from analyzing 
their respective stakeholders through the full project life cycle, including 
formulating applicable influence strategies, and identifying third and fourth order 
stakeholders. 
Clearly acknowledged is the subjective interpretation of various 
characteristics, such as the potential for a stakeholder to be supportive or non-
supportive, or even different interpretations of concepts such as impact, 
relevancy, and user.  Care was taken to accurately follow established literature 
on the GFS and on sea basing.  Definitions were stated in the glossary.  
Interpretations were itemized in the results section to clarify and simplify the 
words and the logic used.  A diverse set of analyses were performed based on 
multiple sources with different perspectives from management scholars over 
three decades.  The proposed organizational structures for the GFS and JSB are 
theoretical constructs based on researched configurations. 
The thesis included qualitative analyses of organizational design, however 
it was beyond the scope of the study to quantitatively test and evaluate110 the 
responsiveness of a GFS organized as a professional bureaucracy or the 
effectiveness and adaptability of a JSB adhocracy.   Computer simulations based 
on behavioral assumptions could generate sufficient metrics to test and evaluate 
which configuration best fit which organization.  Seminar or role playing war- 
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games111 could allow players to act out specific scenarios within the context of 
different organizational structures.  Players' responses could be adjudicated to 
determine which arrangements appeared to work best. 
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